基于内生交易费用的农村集体资产股份制改革  

Research on Rural Collective Assets Stock Reform from the Perspective of Endogenous Transaction Cost

作　　者：张建[1] 诸培新[1] 王敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京农业大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210095

出　　处：《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第5期11-19,共9页Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373128);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20130097110037)

摘　　要：以内生交易费用的视角考察现阶段集体资产股份合作制改革,发现股权集体股的设置导致部分资产产权不清晰,股权封闭和政经不分带来合作社的内部监督失效和激励机制不足,从而引起村干部管理者寻租、偷懒等机会主义行为,增加了合作社治理的内生交易费用。苏州市通过集体股确权到户和股权固化,实施合作社"代理记账",建立村集体财务监管平台和资产交易平台,实现"政经分离"及开放治理等一系列改革措施,明晰了集体资产产权主体,建立了有效的激励约束机制,有利于减少合作社代理人机会主义行为,降低了合作社治理的内生交易费用。苏州经验表明,在农村集体资产股份合作制改革过程中,政府主导力量的恰当发挥是改革的成功前提,同时也要尊重合作社治理的内生动力;通过赋予农民清晰完整的股权,建立顺畅的股权流转体系,有利于合作社内部治理体制的完善;合作社管理者的行为规范还有赖于政府实施的外部监督机制。Rural collective cooperation assets stock reform is characterized by quantitative distribution of capital stock and democratic participation of members. It has explored an effective mechanism with regard to cogovemance of collective economy and assets revenue sharing, which is beneficial to village collective economy development and farmers, property income growth. This paper studies collective assets stock cooperation reform from the perspective of endogenous transaction cost. The results show that, setting in collective stock rights makes it unclear in certain asset property rights. Also, the closed equality and inspiration of governance may lead to the failure in inner inspection and motivation mechanism, and subsequently may arise several opportunities cost such as rentseeking and lacking work motivation of village cadres, which will subsequently increase the inner transaction cost of cooperative. Suzhou city has made reform on collective assets stock cooperation reform such as distributing collective share to every household, solidifying the stock, constructing agency account system of cooperative asset, building village collective financial regulatory platform as well as asset trading platform, and realizing the separation of politics and economy during cooperative governance. Through these reforms, Suzhou has gradually clarified property rights of collective assets, also built effective incentive and restraint mechanism, which are beneficial to reducing both the opportunity cost of cooperative agents and the inner transaction cost of cooperative governance. Reform experience us some inspiration： First, proper government intervention is essential for the success in rural collective assets stock cooperation reform, while internal motive of cooperative governance should also be fully respected. Second, it ^ s available to complete the inner governance mechanism of cooperative through empowering farmers, full and clear stake right, and building a smooth equality transfer system. Third, whether co

关 键 词：农村集体股份合作制 内生交易费用 集体经济 合作社 

分 类 号：F321.42[经济管理—产业经济]