农村水利与污染的博弈论研究  

Study on the game theory between rural water conservation and pollution

作　　者：万强 方义强 杜弟均 

机构地区：[1]重庆市璧山区丁家街道办事处,重庆璧山402764

出　　处：《重庆文理学院学报（社会科学版）》2016年第5期149-152,共4页Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences（Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(31200404)

摘　　要：本文以重庆市璧山区丁家镇为研究对象,对博弈者选择规范治理发展模式和传统发展模式进行博弈模拟.结果显示,博弈者同时选择规范治理发展模式是最佳选择,利益收获最大,分配更加均衡;同时选择规范发展模式有不错的收益,可基本实现可持续发展.只有其中一方选择规范治理发展模式或规范发展模式并非是利益均衡点,分析了污染因素,包括生活污染、工业污染、农业污染和其后的利益博弈关系并提出建议.Taking the Dingjia town of Bishan county in Chongqing as the research object, the selected regula-ting governing development mode and traditional development mode for the gamer were gaming simulated. The results show that choosing the regulating governing development mode for the gamers is the best option, with the maximum benefits, and more balanced distribution ; and it can achieve the susbtainable develop-ment. Only one part to choose the regulating governing developing mode or regulating developing mode is not the benifit balancing point. The pollution factors, including the life pollution, industrial pollution, agri- cuture pollution, and the benefit gaming relationship were analyzed, and the corresponding measures were proposed.

关 键 词：水体污染 乡镇 规范治理发展模式 利益博弈 

分 类 号：S731.2[农业科学—林学]