晋升激励、政府偏好与区域经济增长  

Political Incentive,Governmental Preference and Regional Economic Growth

作　　者：后小仙[1] 郑田丹 

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学公共经济学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《财贸研究》2016年第4期68-75,100,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目"国家治理能力评估指标体系及治理指数研究"(2014ZDAXM004);江苏省教育科学"十二五"规划课题"江苏省高等教育绩效评价及审计监管研究"(B-a/2015/01/048);教育部人文社科项目"基于人工免疫神经网络的省域经济安全预警机制研究"(12YJA790047)

摘　　要：利用1999—2013年省级面板数据,考察二元晋升激励与三维政府偏好对区域经济增长的作用机制。研究发现:投资最大化激励在短期内会迅速推动经济增长,而公共服务最大化激励长期内对经济增长有显著促进作用;将晋升激励、政府偏好与经济增长纳入同一框架后发现:投资最大化激励对投资性偏好、公共服务最大化激励对服务性偏好有显著的促进作用;同投资最大化激励相比,公共服务最大化激励诱导地方政府选择平衡性偏好。This article investigates the mechanism of action of two - dimensional political incentive and three -dimensional governmental preference on regional economic growth through provincial panel data of China from 1999 to 2013. The study f＇mds out that maximization of investment incentive promotes economic growth rapidly in a short term, while maximization of public services incentive has a significant effect on e- conomic growth in a long term. Further study about political incentive, governmental preference and eco- nomic growth under the same frame shows that maximization of investment services incentive has a signifi- cant role in promoting investment preference, while maximization of public services incentive has a signifi- cant effect on service preference. Compared with maximization of investment incentive, maximization of public services incentive has more strength in forcing local government to choose balanced preference.

关 键 词：晋升激励 政府偏好 区域经济增长 公共服务 

分 类 号：F291.1[经济管理—国民经济]