代理成本、独立董事独立性与业绩快报自愿披露  

Agency Cost,Independent Director's Independence and Voluntary Disclosure of Earnings Preannouncement

作　　者：万鹏[1] 陈翔宇[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《财贸研究》2016年第4期137-146,共10页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题"民营上市公司强制性业绩预测评价:理论分析与浙江经验"(16NDJC192YB);浙江省自然科学基金项目"我国上市公司营收计划披露的特征研究"(LQ14G020002);国家自然科学基金项目"管理层盈余预测乐观偏差:影响因素与经济后果"(71502166)

摘　　要：以2004—2013年A股上市公司为样本,基于中国特有的业绩快报披露制度,探讨股东与管理层之间的代理成本对业绩快报自愿披露行为的影响。研究发现,代理成本越高的公司,管理层自愿披露业绩快报的可能性越小。在此基础上,考察独立董事的独立性对代理成本与业绩快报自愿披露之间关系的影响,结果表明独立董事在信息披露方面并不具有显著的治理作用。Using the sample listed fmns in China from 2004 to 2013, and based on China unique disclosure regulation on earnings preannouncements, this paper examines whether the agency costs between managements and shareholders affect the voluntary disclosure of earnings preannouncement. The study shows that the higher the agency cost between shareholders and managers, the more likely that managers ignore the interests of investors, and thus the lower the probability to voluntarily disclose the earnings prean- nouncements. The paper investigates the effects of independent director＇s independence on the relationship between agency cost and the voluntary disclosure of earnings preannouncement, and finds that no evidence supporting the independent directors have a governance role in protecting investor＇s interests.

关 键 词：代理成本 独立董事独立性 业绩快报 自愿披露 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]