考虑额外服务和渠道地位的供应链信息共享均衡策略  

Information Sharing in Supply Chains with Additional Service Warrant and Channel Status

作　　者：肖美丹[1] 陈铭洋 沙德春[1] 李幸子 

机构地区：[1]河南农业大学信息与管理科学学院,郑州450046

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第9期99-103,111,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家软科学研究计划项目(2012GXS4D091)

摘　　要：构建了考虑额外服务和渠道地位因素的供应链信息共享模型,比较三种信息共享方式下供应链各成员的收益值,分析了额外服务和渠道地位因素对供应链均衡策略的影响。结果表明:渠道地位对等时,信息共享为均衡策略,提供的额外服务能为共享零售商和制造商带来收益;若产品相关系数小于零,额外服务对未共享信息方的收益有促进作用,反之有抑制作用。渠道地位不对等时,如果共享信息零售商的渠道地位足够低并且产品相关系数较小,或者产品相关系数较大、需求信号不精确,则共享信息仍为均衡策略,此时提供额外服务有利于制造商;若需求信号精确、产品相关系数较小,或共享信息的零售商渠道地位较高、产品相关系数较大,则额外服务的实施有利于零售商。This paper constructs the information sharing model of the supply chain with additional service warrant and chan- nel status. Comparing the profit of retailers and manufacture by three different information sharing strategy, it studies how the additional service and channel status to affect the equilibrium strategy of the supply chain. Results show that, if the channel status equals, information sharing is the equilibrium strategy, and providing additional service can bring benefits to sharing retailers and the manufacturer. If the product correlation coefficient is less than zero, additional service is benefit to the retailer which doesn＇t share information; otherwise, it will be opposite. When channel status is unequal, if the deman- ding information is accurate and the product correlation coefficient is small, the information sharing is still the equilibrium strategy. However, offering additional service at this time is always benefit to manufacturers while is benefit to retailers only within a specific range.

关 键 词：额外服务 渠道地位 均衡策略 信息共享 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济] F274