反腐败与中国公司治理优化：一个准自然实验  

Anti-corruption and Chinese Corporate Governance:A Quasi-Natural Experiment

作　　者：王茂斌[1] 孔东民[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学,北京100029 [2]中南财经政法大学,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《金融研究》2016年第8期159-174,共16页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：尽管精确地评估反腐败对经济的影响具有重要学术意义与政策价值,但囿于数据以及计量识别策略,当前研究还存在诸多争议和不足。本文利用一个中国的准自然实验作为外生冲击,来识别反腐败与微观企业行为之间的因果关系。具体而言,我们利用倍差法(DID)考察十八大前后中国上市公司的公司治理、高管激励与股东价值是否发生了变化,研究发现:(1)十八大之后,高腐败地区上市公司的现金持有的市场价值明显增加,同时此类上市公司的高管薪酬业绩敏感性也显著提高。(2)在会计质量方面,高腐败地区上市公司在十八大后财务报表质量明显提升,同时盈余管理的情况显著减少。此外,我们还发现,高腐败地区上市公司在十八大后会计质量的改善主要集中于非国有企业,高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升则主要集中于国有企业。本文研究丰富了反腐败研究文献,为我国进一步深化改革实践提供了政策参考,即反腐败有助于改善公司治理,强化高管激励机制和提高会计质量,从而最终增进股东价值。Using China＇s 18th Party Congress as an exogenous policy impact event, we study the effects of anti - corruption on firm behaviors. We find that after China＇s 18th Party Congress, compared with listed firms in China＇s cities with lower corruption incidence, those firms in cities with higher corruption incidence have a significantly increased executive pay - performance and meanwhile the value of their cash holdings increases significantly. We also find that listed firms in China＇s cities with higher corruption incidence see their financial statement regularities make better and decrease earnings management after China＇s 18th Party Congress. The further analysis shows that accounting quality improvement effects of the anti - corruption movement mainly occur in non - state firms, but improvement in executive pay - performance sensitivity mainly comes from State owned firms. Our study provides evidence for the negative effect of corruption on corporate governance, executive incentive and sharehdder value.

关 键 词：十八大 反腐败 公司治理 中国 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学] F271[政治法律—中共党史]