政企合谋与企业逃税:来自国税局长异地交流的证据  

Collusion for Evasion:Evidence from the Rotation of NTBs' Directors in China

作　　者：范子英[1] 田彬彬[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]中南财经政法大学财政税务学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2016年第3期1303-1328,共26页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71573165;71303083);教育部人文社会科学研究基金(11YJC790039;15YJC790097);上海财经大学创新团队支持计划的资助

摘　　要：本文以1998年实施的国税局长异地交流制度为自然实验,利用此次改革导致的局长任职经历差异度量了地方的政企合谋,基于1998—2007年间的制造业企业和国税局长的匹配数据,研究了政企合谋对企业逃税的影响。我们发现:本地晋升的局长(相比外地调入局长)政企合谋更严重,由此导致的企业平均税负相差17%;外调局长的效应在任期8年后完全消失;由于政企合谋根源于引资竞争,因此合谋导致的逃税仅存在于流动性足够高的企业类型,如外企和私企;政企合谋的逃税效应与税种的监管难度正相关,如企业所得税逃税较多,而增值税则没有显著影响。This paper takes the rotation of directors of the National Tax Bureaus（NTB）since 1998 as a natural experiment to measure their collusion with firms and explores the impacts of collusion using the firm level data.We find that,firstly,the local NTB directors are more likely to collude than rotated directors and then result in a 17% more corporate tax burden.Secondly,collusion is correlated to the term of directors,the effect of rotated directors disappeared after the eighth year.Thirdly,the tax evasion from collusion only exists within companies with high mobility,such as foreign companies and private firms.Lastly,collusion exists only in those hardly regulated taxes like corporate income tax,while it has no impacts on VAT.

关 键 词：逃税 政企合谋 国税局长 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学] F275.4[政治法律—经济法学] D922.22[政治法律—法学]