基于信号博弈的网购市场逆向选择行为研究  

Research on the Adverse Selection Problem in On-line Shopping Market based on the Theory of Signaling Game

作　　者：李新剑[1,2] 徐大伍[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽机电职业技术学院经贸管理系,安徽芜湖241000 [2]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310023

出　　处：《安徽商贸职业技术学院学报》2016年第3期6-10,共5页Journal of Anhui Business College

基　　金：2015年安徽省人文社科重点项目(SK2015A617)

摘　　要：随着网络购物的迅速发展,网购市场逆向选择问题日渐突出。逆向选择会导致市场消失,而网购市场的火爆似乎用传统理论无法解释。为了有效解释此类问题,在引用旧车市场模型的基础上,引进效用评价系数,对原有模型进行扩展,解释了市场长期存在却又和逆向选择并存的情况。在此基础上,构建信号博弈模型,分别讨论了分离均衡和混同均衡下市场的有效性问题。最后,根据研究结果提出了若干解决网购市场逆向选择的对策。Wth the rapid development of on-line shopping, the adverse selection problem is gradually revealed. Adverse selection will cause disappearance of market. However on-line shopping market has been very hot, which seems to be hard to explain using traditional theory. This paper introduces utility evaluation coefficient to extend the second-hand market model, which can explain the long-tenn co-existence of adverse selection and the market. On this basis, the paper constmcts signal game model, discusses respectively the the validity of market under separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures to solve the adverse selection in online shopping market according to the results of the study.

关 键 词：旧车市场 逆向选择 劣质商品 信号博弈 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]