我国公立医院医生诱导需求的防范与规制研究——基于激励规制理论的视角  

Studying on the prevention and regulation of supply-induced demand of doctors in public hospitals in view of incentive regulatory theory

作　　者：张晓燕[1] 袁萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《中国卫生事业管理》2016年第9期664-666,共3页Chinese Health Service Management

摘　　要：我国公立医院医生的诱导需求是我国居民看病贵的一个极其重要的原因。在信息不对称、各主体目标不一致以及公立医院占有垄断地位的情况下,政府、公立医院、医生以及患者之间的委托代理关系为医生诱导需求的发生提供了契机。激励规制是政府规制手段中的一种重要的方式,运用激励规制理论来防范医生诱导需求不仅仅要对公立医院医生进行规制,同时还要强调对医院等相关主体的规制。Supply-induced demand of doctors in public hospitals is one of the most important factors to expensive medical cost in China. In circumstances of information asymmetry, inconformity targets among different subjects and the monopoly position of public hospitals, the principal-agency relationship among the government, public hospitals, doctors and patients provides opportunity to supply-induced demand of doctors. As a significant regulatory method of governmental regulation,incentive regulatory theory can be used to regulate supply-induced demand of doctors, which regulates not only doctors in public hospitals, but also the hospitals and other relevant subjects.

关 键 词：诱导需求 防范 激励规制 

分 类 号：R197.32[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]