网络外部性下双零售商竞争的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of duopoly retailers' competition under network externality

作　　者：易余胤[1] 杨海深[1] 张显玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广州510632

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第9期34-48,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571086);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2014A030313391);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(12JNQM002);暨南大学管理学院重点学科建设育题基金资助项目(GY14005)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈理论,分析了在网络外部性环境下,有限理性的零售商在长期的市场竞争演化中,会偏好选择利润最大化行为还是收入最大化行为的问题.首先,在考虑网络外部性因素下,构建了不对称双零售商竞争的演化博弈动态系统.其次,分析了该动态系统中零售商竞争的演化稳定策略,并研究了产品替代性、网络外部性强度和市场保留价格等因素对零售商演化稳定策略的影响.再次,将模型扩展到混合策略情形,研究了零售商行为偏好的演化稳定性,并分析了市场保留价格对零售商行为偏好演化稳定性的影响.最后,通过数值算例,进一步分析和验证了所取得的理论成果.The problem how retailers with bounded rationality, in the long-term evolution of market eompeti-tion with network externalities, chooses between profit maximization and revenue maximization for their market- ing strategies is investigated using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, considering network externality, this pa- per develops a dynamic evolutionary game of the asymmetric duopoly retailers＇ competition. Secondly, the pa- per discusses the evolutionary stable strategies （ESS） of the dynamic system that depend on product substitut- ability, the strength of network externality, and the market reservation price, and examines their effects on the ESS. Thirdly, it is extended to the case where retailers can choose a mixed strategy with any preference ratio, and the effect of the market reservation price on the evolutionary stability of retailers＇ preference ratio is ex- plored. Lastly, numerical examples are given to verify the theoretical results.

关 键 词：网络外部性 利润最大化 收入最大化 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]