中国官僚体制与普通官员行为:三个治理工具  

Chinese Bureaucracy and the Ordinary Official Behavior:Three Governance Instruments

作　　者：宋琳[1,2] 赖诗攀[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院,广州510275 [2]华侨大学政治与公共管理学院,福建泉州362021

出　　处：《甘肃行政学院学报》2016年第3期13-23,126,共11页Journal of Gansu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目"公共危机管理中地方政府行为取向的动力机制研究"(11CGL094)

摘　　要：普通官员日常工作行为构成国家运行的微观基础。与现有文献聚焦主要官员行为不同,本文从组织经济学视角研究中国官僚体制中蕴含的普通官员行为治理工具。论文首先从现有文献中归纳出中国官僚体制常规和运动两种治理模式共同蕴含的普通官员行为的三个治理工具:激励强度、行政控制和资源约束,然后以公共危机管理为例,提出研究假设,运用针对地方普通官员的问卷调查数据进行实证检验。研究发现,在台风灾害和群体事件两类公共危机的常规和运动两种治理模式中,激励强度、行政控制和资源约束均具有显著的普通官员行为意义。这意味着它们是两种治理模式的共同结构要素,并构成普通官员行为的三个稳定的治理工具。Ordinary official behavior in daily work constitutes the Micro foundation of the state operation. Different from the existing literature focusing on the behavior of the principal officials,drawing on insights from organizational economics, the governance instruments of ordinary official behavior in public bureaucracy have been analyzed in this research. Base on the existing literature we summarize three governance instruments of ordinary official behavior included both in 'routine' and 'campaignstyle' governance modes: incentive intensity, administrative control and resource constraint. Then, an empirical test is carry out under typhoon disaster and mass incidents management situation. It is found that incentive intensity, administrative control and resource constraint have significant meaning to the behavior of ordinary officials in both 'routine' and 'campaign-style' governance models. It means that they are common structural elements of 'routine' and 'campaign-style' governance models of Chinese bureaucracy, and constitute three steady governance instruments of ordinary official behavior.

关 键 词：官僚体制 运动式治理 常规式治理 普通官员行为 公共危机管理 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]