政府环境监管与企业最优环境策略的博弈  

RESEARCH ON THE GAME BETWEEN GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND OPTIMAL STRATEGY OF ENTERPRISES

作　　者：刘体劲 吴迪[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《环境工程》2016年第9期148-151,共4页Environmental Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金管理学部重点资助项目(71132006)

摘　　要：随着我国经济的快速发展,伴随而来的是日趋严峻的环境污染,而在政府环境监管的背景下,各个利益相关者之间的博弈在环保效果实施中发挥了很大的作用。利用博弈论的分析方法,建立了一个关于中央政府、地方政府和企业三个利益相关者之间的利益博弈模型,通过对该模型的求解得出三方的平衡状态。最后针对如何实现政府高效监管和企业最优环境策略,向博弈三方共同努力推动社会经济可持续发展提供了相关政策建议。With the rapid development of China ＇s economy,the environmental pollution is becoming increasingly serious.Under the background of government environmental regulation,the effect of environmental governance largely depends on how the stakeholders play games with each other. This paper employed the method in game theory,and established a game model involving central government,local governments and firms. By solving the model,the equilibrium state of the three parties was obtained. This paper also gave suggestions on improving regulation efficiency,promoting firms to be more environment-friendly and making the three parties work together to develope the economy in a sustainable way.

关 键 词：环境管制 中央政府 地方政府 博弈 

分 类 号：X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]