劳动者流动决策的博弈分析框架  

A Game Analysis Framework of Labors' Flow Decision

作　　者：田辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京劳动保障职业学院,北京100029

出　　处：《北京劳动保障职业学院学报》2016年第3期28-32,共5页Journal of Beijing Vocational College Of Labour And Social Security

摘　　要：劳动者的离职行为会受到劳动者与雇主双方的自身特征和所处的生产过程本身特点的影响,劳动者流动决策是劳动者与雇主双方进行讨价还价博弈的结果反应。企业剩余的分享是影响劳动者流动决策的重要因素,劳动者若不能通过谈判获得相对应的剩余比例,他就会通过"用脚投票"的方式来表达其诉求。Labors＇ departure behavior will be affected by their own characteristics between workers and employers and the characteristics of the production process itself.Labors＇ flow decision making is the result of the bargaining game for both sides.The enterprise of the rest of the share is one of the important factors that affect the labors＇ exit decision.The workers will through the way of＂vote with their feet＂to express their demands if the employee cannot obtain the corresponding residual ratio through negotiation.

关 键 词：流动决策 讨价还价 博弈分析框架 

分 类 号：F241.2[经济管理—劳动经济]