如何实现创业企业控制权最优配置?——基于演化博弈的分析研究  

How to realize the optimal allocation of the control rights of the enterprise?——Based on evolutionary game theory

作　　者：陈涛[1] 党兴华[1] 韩瑾[1] 贾窦洁 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《西安理工大学学报》2016年第3期374-378,共5页Journal of Xi'an University of Technology

基　　金：教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20106118110012);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172201);陕西省软科学计划资助项目(2011KRZ08)

摘　　要：为使我国创业企业控制权模式更加的合理规范,本文运用复制动态的方法,通过研究创业企业家与风险投资家在博弈过程中的控制权策略选择及由此决定的控制权模式,分析发现:1在创业企业家和风险投资家选择是否争取控制权策略的博弈结果中,联合控制或相机控制是最优模式。2当项目成功概率、控制权共享收益、风险投资家获取的剩余索取权、特定控制权、项目净残值、投资家战略收益等影响因素增加时,控制权模式收敛于联合控制,反之则收敛于相机控制;当项目成功的概率大于50%,投资家固定收益增加时,控制权模式收敛于相机控制。In order to make our enterprise control rights pattern more reasonable, this paper appliesthe method for dynamic replication, through a research on venture capitalists and entrepreneursin the process of the game selection and the pattern, with the result showing that： ①Of allthe results for the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to choose control rights completely ornot, the joint control or contigent control is the optimal mode. ② For the probability of the projectsuccess, control of revenue sharing, the venture capitalists obtaining the surplus value, specificcontrol rights, project net residual value, investment strategic income and the other increasingfactors, control model converges to the joint control, and to the contigent control. As the successfulprobability of the project over 50% , the investors constant income increase, and controlmodel converges to the contigent control.

关 键 词：控制权 演化博弈 策略 均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]