怪人假设——意识理论的试金石  

Zombie Hypotheses:A Litmus Test for Various Theories of Consciousness

作　　者：陈敬坤[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学社会学学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2016年第5期56-61,共6页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目:"二维语义学及相关问题研究"(项目编号:11CZX043);"当代语义学视域中的意义与规范性问题研究"(项目编号:12CZX041);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目:"规则遵循相关问题的语义分析及语境解释"(项目编号:10YJC720065)

摘　　要：怪人假设为我们理解和把握心灵哲学的核心问题提供了很好的方式。怪人假设的核心是怪人的可能性问题,这一问题被认为是物理主义的一个严重挑战。由于怪人与意识生物的同一性存在行为、功能和物理三个层面,对可能性的理解同样存在严重的分歧与争议,因而怪人的可能性问题实际上是何种怪人在何种意义上可能的问题,通过这样一种方式怪人假设几乎与每一种意识理论都紧密相关,任何一种成功的意识理论都无法完全回避怪人假设。The Zombie Hypotheses provide us a sensible way to understand the core issues of philosophy of mind. The crux of Zombie Hypotheses is its possibility, which was taken as a serious challenge to physicalism. Given there are three ways in which zombies can be stipulated as identical to conscious creatures： behavioral, functional, and physical, while there are substantial disagreements and divergences on the conception of possibility, the problem of zombie＇s possibility thus can be specified as ＂in what sense of possibility a behavioral/ functional/physical zombie is identical to a conscious creature＂. In this way, the Zombie Hypotheses is associated with almost all kinds of theories of consciousness, which means a successful theory of consciousness has to face up to the Zombie Hypotheses.

关 键 词：怪人假设 可能性 功能主义 物理主义 

分 类 号：N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]