委托-代理理论下园区依托型国有创投企业治理问题探析:以张江火炬为例  

A Study on the Governance of the State Owned Venture Capital Enterprises Based on the Principal Agent Theory:an Case of Zhangjiang

作　　者：孙洁[1] 鲍竹[2] Sun Jie Bao Zhi(Department Economic Research Institute Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Shanghai 200020, China College of Economic and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China)

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院部门经济研究所,上海200020 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2016年第20期50-54,共5页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14CGL059)

摘　　要：园区依托型国有创投企业在"大众创业、万众创新"的政策环境以及园区发展转型升级的宏观背景下,具有很大的发展潜力。通过委托代理模型的构建和推导,研究发现:国有创投企业投资行为的期望收入,与委托人的行动效率、受到的限制约束以及代理人的业务水平、努力程度、风险规避度相关。通过张江火炬的个案分析,探讨具有普适性意义的问题,即国有体制下的治理机制与创投行业高度市场化发展之间的矛盾。最后,就如何优化现有国有创投企业治理机制、提升国有创投绩效,提出了建议。The park type state owned venture capital enterprises have a very good development prospects,with the current policy environment and macro background.Through the principal-agent model of construction and inference,the study found that expected revenue of state owned venture capital enterprises is related with the efficiency of the clients＇ action and their constraints,as well as the agent＇s business level,efforts,and risk aversion.The problems encounters in the whole process,to a certain extent,reflect the contradiction between the state-owed system and the venture capital industry,by considering the case of Zhangjiang and even expanding to a wider range.Finally,some ideas on how to optimize the corporate governance and operating mechanism of the existing state-owned venture capital enterprises are put forward.

关 键 词：委托代理理论 国有创投 公司治理 园区依托型 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]