甄选与激励:中国政府人事层级细分的内在机制  

Sorting and Incentives: Why Do We Need More Thresholds in China's Government Hierarchies

作　　者：钟灵娜 耿曙[2] 陈玮[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]浙江大学公共管理学院社会学系 [3]华东理工大学社会工作与社会政策研究院

出　　处：《公共行政评论》2016年第5期126-144,共19页Journal of Public Administration

基　　金：上海财经大学2014年研究生创新基金项目"官僚细分层级结构与晋升机制研究"(CXJJ-2014-408)

摘　　要：尽管中国政府明确划分了行政级别,但在现有的行政级别内还存在着更细致划分的职务层级。论文提出了"层级细分"的概念来解释这一现象,并根据人事经济学的理论,阐释制度设计的原因:一是为了甄别竞争官员的实际能力,通过增设的层级,增加考核的机会并创造晋升的激励;二是为了强化竞争官员的晋升激励,通过增设的层级,划分竞争的组别并降低官员异质性。论文运用中共十五大以后省级领导的人事调动情况,对上述两项理论假设进行检证,藉此展示出中国政府甄选和拔擢官员的制度逻辑。While clearly divided administrative levels in the Chinese government exist,thispaper shows further divided ranks and levels inside each administrative level. Why does the Chinese government need these additional ranks and levels in its governmental hierarchies? Using the theories of personnel economics,this paper gives two theoretical explanations for the additionally established ranks and levels. First the incorporation of more assessments of an official's abilities gives the candidate more incentivesto pass the assessments. Second,additional levels reduce the chance of competition among unequal candidates and thus increases incentives. Using personnel transfer data at the provincial level after the 15 thNational Congress of the CCP to test these two theoretical hypotheses,the paperfurther illustrates the economic logic of the structural design of Chinese government.

关 键 词：人事激励 甄选 层级制 官僚体制 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学]