农民参与对农地整治工程质量的影响研究  

Study on Influence of Farmers' Participation in Quality of Farmland Consolidation

作　　者：吴诗嫚[1,2] 杨钢桥[3] 赵微[3] 

机构地区：[1]武汉工程大学管理学院,湖北武汉430205 [2]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310058 [3]华中农业大学公共管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第6期102-108,146,共7页Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"粮食主产区农地整理项目农户参与机制研究"(12BGL078);国家自然科学基金项目"农地整理项目建后管护模式的绩效及其影响机理研究"(71403094);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"农地整治权属调整中多元利益主体的博弈与协调机制研究"(16YJC630138);国土资源部土地整治中心项目"多功能土地整治模式研究"(2016-01-26);武汉工程大学科学研究基金项目"农村土地整治权属调整中农民土地权益保护研究"(K201538)

摘　　要：通过构建博弈模型,以湖北省部分县市360份农民问卷为样本,采用定序回归,分析农民监督对农地整治项目工程质量的影响机理,以期为遏制监理与施工单位的合谋行为,提高项目工程质量提供依据。结论表明:目前农地整治项目区工程质量普遍较低,主要原因在于广大的受益农民被排除在工程质量监督之外,难以发挥社会监督的效力,监理与施工单位的合谋行为得不到有效约束。而引入项目区农民参与施工监督,具有理论和实践的可行性。相关部门应从制度建设和政策实施层面探索并构建农民参与农地整治的工程质量监管机制,有助于项目工程质量的提高和整体功效的发挥。Based on the survey data of 360 farmers in some counties and cities of Hubei Province,this paper uses game model and OLM to analyze the influencing mechanism of farmers' supervision in quality of farmland consolidation project in order to regulate collusive behavior between supervision and contractors.The result shows that farmland consolidation project is generally in poor quality because farmers who are benefited from these projects are excluded from the quality supervision,which is so hard to achieve the effectiveness of public supervision and the collusive behavior between supervision and contractors cannot be constrained.Therefore,encouraging farmers' participation in supervision from farmland consolidation area is reasonable both in theory and practice.Farmers' supervision mechanism of farmland consolidation project should be built by all relevant departments,which will improve the quality and performance of the projects.

关 键 词：农地整治 工程质量 合谋行为 农民参与 

分 类 号：F301.24[经济管理—产业经济]