基于偏好序列的“三方两边”威慑问题的谈判解  

Bargaining Solution of “Tripartite and Biliteral”Deterrence Based on Preference Order

作　　者：王硕[1] 谢政[1] 游光荣[2] 戴丽[1] WANG Shuo XIE Zheng YOU Guang-rong DAI Li(National University of Defense Technology, College of Science, Changsha 410073, China Troops 63928 PLA ,Beijing 100101, China)

机构地区：[1]国防科技大学理学院 [2]中国人民解放军63928部队

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2016年第5期184-187,共4页Operations Research and Management Science

摘　　要：本文从合作博弈的角度对于"三方两边"威慑问题进行讨论,首先对局中人分类并利用不完全信息博弈的思想构造效用函数,其次构造合作双矩阵博弈,进而求出合作双矩阵博弈的谈判解,给出弱方到底该与哪一强方结盟以及结盟后双方进行恐吓的理论分析方法。最后求解具体实例,并对研究做出总结。T.his paper discusses ＂Tripartite and Biliteral＂ deterrence with bargaining solution in cooperative gamewhich is not same with other relevant works before. In this paper utility functions are created on the basis of pref-erence order and the types of players are determined by using the method of games with incomplete information.After this, the corresponding payoff matrix is constructed and used to give a bargaining solution. Moreover, afinal decision of the cooperative plan to the weak one is offered by solving two cases under different cooperation.As well, an analysis of threat problem is made after following the cooperative plan. Then an example is calculatedby the above approach and a conclusion of this paper is given at last.

关 键 词：谈判解 博弈论 威慑 偏好序列 不完全信息 效用函数 

分 类 号：E911[军事]