基于混合溢出的双寡头R&D合作及政府激励  

R&D cooperation between duopoly with mixed spillovers and the corresponding government incentives

作　　者：李艳茹[1] 李向辉[1] 张巍巍[1] Li Yanru Li Xianghui Zhang Weiwei(Jiangsu Institute of Science and Technology Information, Nanjing 210042, China)

机构地区：[1]江苏省科学技术情报研究所,江苏南京210042

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2016年第5期609-617,共9页Journal of Systems Engineering

摘　　要：基于德阿斯普利蒙特一杰奎明模型(AJ模型),构建了考虑混合溢出的四阶段古诺竞争模型,分别分析了在政府和企业的四个决策阶段,双寡头采用四种合作模式对利润、政府补贴、社会福利等的影响.结果表明,双寡头企业会倾向于完全合作来最大化自身利润;从补贴最小化的角度,政府应鼓励企业进行充分的R&D合作,但在产量阶段竞争并各自决定技术溢出;从社会福利的角度,政府希望企业仅在产量阶段竞争,而在R&D和技术溢出阶段充分合作.Based on the D＇Aspremont and Jacquemin model （AJ Model）, a four-stage Cournot model involving mixed spillovers is constructed. In the four decision stages of the government and enterprises, the influences of four different cooperation patterns of duopoly on the corresponding profits, government subsidies, social welfare, etc. are analyzed respectively. The conclusions show that the duopoly would be inclined to cooperate completely to maximize profits. To minimize subsidies, the government can encourage enterprises to cooperate adequately in the R＆D stage but to compete in the yields stage and decide their own technology spillovers; to increase social welfare, the government can promote competition in the yields stage with full cooperation in R＆D and spillovers stages.

关 键 词：混合溢出 双寡头 R&D 补贴 合作 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]