基于增信成本分担比例的中小企业信贷循环机制  

Credit revolving mechanism of SMEs based on credit enhancement costs-sharing

作　　者：刘红生[1,2] 李帮义[1] Liu Hongsheng Li Bangyi(College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China Ningbo Yinzhou Rural Cooperative Bank, Ningbo 315100, China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106 [2]宁波鄞州农村合作银行,浙江宁波315100

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2016年第5期625-632,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(13AZD062);教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20113218110024)

摘　　要：在银企双方博弈的基础上,分析中小企业信贷循环中增信成本分担问题.引进第三方增信机构,建立基于第三方增信的银企博弈模型,讨论了增信成本在银行和中小企业之间的分担比例,以及对系统收益的影响.研究表明,中小企业承担的增信成本比例能够帕累托改进银行和企业的收益,中小企业全部承担增信成本,系统收益达到最优,从而通过合理的分担增信成本,达到优化信贷循环模型收益的目的.Based on the game between banks and SMEs, credit enhancement cost-sharing in the credit revolving of SMEs is studied. Third party credit enhancement institutions are introduced into the model of SMEs＇ revolving credit, and a game model between banks and SMEs is established. In the model of credit enhancement, the credit enhancement costs-sharing between banks and SMEs and the effects of system profit for credit enhancement operation model are discussed. The result indicates that SMEs sharing in the enhancement costs realizes Pareto improvement of both banks＇ and SMEs＇ return. And if SMEs bear all the costs, system return can be maximized. The research concluded that the credit revolving model＇s return can be optimized through reasonable apportionment of the credit enhancement costs.

关 键 词：增信博弈 成本分担 利益协调 增信机构 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F224.32