基于系统动力学的事故瞒报博弈演化研究  

Study on evolutionary game of accident cover-up based on system dynamics

作　　者：郭进平[1] 耿阳[1] 张星[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安建筑科技大学材料与矿资学院

出　　处：《中国安全科学学报》2016年第9期106-111,共6页China Safety Science Journal

基　　金：陕西省安全生产监督管理局基金资助;西安建筑科技大学重点培育学科建设基金资助(XK201205);资助项目:陕西省金属非金属矿山安全水平综合评价研究

摘　　要：为研究事故瞒报问题的深层原因,采用演化博弈和系统动力学(SD)方法,在复制动态方程的基础上,构建安监部门和施工单位间的博弈系统流图模型,分析采用纯策略、随机策略、混合策略及动态惩罚措施情况下事故瞒报问题的演化博弈过程及影响因子;利用Vensim_Ple仿真软件,对系统进行模拟仿真分析。结果表明,施工单位不瞒报的概率会随安监部门调查强度的增加而趋于稳定;安监部门对施工单位的调查概率、惩罚力度是影响事故瞒报问题是否发生的重要因素。In order to study the underlying causes of the accident cover-up, on the basis of the replicated dynamic equation, the evolutionary game and system dynamics（SD） method are adopted to construct the game system flow graph model of safety supervision departments and construction units. The evolutionary game regular pattern and the influence factors of the accident cover-up problem in pure strategy, random strategy, mixed strategy and dynamic penalty are analyzed and simulated by using the simulation software of Vensim_Ple. The result shows that the probability of no accident cover-up of the construction units tends to be stable with the increasing investigation intensity of the safety supervision departments, and that the investigating probability and the levels of punishment are the important factors affecting the occurrence of accident cover-up.

关 键 词：事故瞒报 系统动力学(SD) 演化博弈 纳什均衡 Vensim_Ple仿真 

分 类 号：X928.02[环境科学与工程—安全科学]