非对称约束、银行间竞争与货币政策敏感性——基于商业银行信贷渠道的理论与实证  

Asymmetric Constraints,Banking Competition and Monetary Policy Sensitivity——Based on Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test of Bank Loan Channels

作　　者：郑斌[1] 王晓芳[1] Zheng Bin1 Wang Xiaofang2

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2016年第11期12-24,共13页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：本文利用博弈理论分别构建了在利率管制和市场化环境下的异质性银行垄断竞争模型,对大型和中小型银行贷款供给的政策敏感性进行了比较分析。研究发现,在利率管理制价格约束环境下,银行间竞争表现为规模博弈,大型商业银行的政策敏感性要强于中小银行。而在利率市场化环境下,价格博弈是商业银行竞争的主要形式,大型商业银行的政策敏感性弱于中小银行。同时,在实际业务操作中,0.9倍基准利率仍然是实际贷款利率浮动下限。随后本文分析了信贷市场供需结构,并结合银行微观数据进行了实证检验,结果支持了理论模型的研究结论。因此,货币政策调控信贷供给的过程中,需要关注信贷市场供需状况和异质性银行的政策敏感性,通过加强结构型工具的作用,稳定中小银行的流动性,进而为中小企业融资提供稳定的货币环境。This paper uses game theory to construct two monopolistic competition models of heterogeneous banks respectively in the environment of loan interest rate constraint and marketization, and for the purpose of comparatively analyzing the sensitivity of monetary policy of heterogeneous banks, the study reveals the policy sensitivity is proportional to the bank size in size com- petition of price constraint environment, and policy sensitivity is inversely proportional to size in price competition of price mar- ketization. And in the actual business operations, O. 9 tines of the benchmark interest rate is still the floating lower limit of ac- tual lending rate. This paper uses static and threshold panel data model to test the theoretical results empirically. Finally this paper puts forward some policy recommendations according to research findings.

关 键 词：价格约束 垄断竞争模型 政策敏感性 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F822.0