带惩罚机制的银行信贷合同设计  

Design of Bank Credit Contract with Punishment Mechanism

作　　者：张晓霞[1] 徐庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛大学商学院,青岛266071

出　　处：《复旦学报（自然科学版）》2016年第5期553-559,共7页Journal of Fudan University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71471112;70971070;11401331);青岛市应用基础研究计划(14-2-4-57-jch)

摘　　要：针对市场中只有两类信用水平的企业,运用惩罚机制,建立了银行信贷合同设计模型,给出了不同信用水平企业的信贷合同.研究表明,当不同信用水平企业的机会效用之差大于某一值时,低信用企业才有假冒高信用企业的积极性.相对于信息对称下的信贷合同,银行可适当增加高信用企业的贷款额度,吸引他们贷款.同时增加对低信用企业说谎的惩罚力度.当两类信用水平企业的机会成本相差较大时,为防止低信用企业说谎,激励其积极还贷,除增加对说谎者的惩罚力度,可适当减少低信用企业的贷款利率.For a market which there only exist two kinds of credit level enterprises, using the punishment mechanism, the bank credit contract model is established, and the credit contract of enterprises with different credit level is obtained. The results of research shows that, only when the difference of enterprise with different credit level in the opportunity utility is greater than a certain value, the low credit level enterprise has enthusiasm for counterfeiting the high credit level enterprise. Compared with the credit contract under the condition of symmetry, bank can appropriately increase the loan amount for high credit enterprises to attract them to loan. At the same time, it can increase the punishment on low credit companies who are unhonest. However, when the difference of opportunity utility between the two types of credit level of enterprise is relatively larger, in order to prevent the low credit enterprise lie and encourage them repay the loans actively, banks should increase the punishment on liars, and provide low loan interest rate to them compared to the situation of information symmetry.

关 键 词：惩罚机制 信息不对称 信贷合同 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F830.56[经济管理—金融学]