补偿机制下研究生培养单位的淘汰行为研究  

Research on Selective Elimination Behavior of Graduate Education Organizations under the Compensatory Mechanism

作　　者：宋朝阳[1] Song Zhaoyang(Graduate School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 43007)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学研究生院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2016年第5期164-169,共6页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences

摘　　要：对实行了培养过程分流淘汰的研究生培养单位予以招生计划补偿,可以降低培养单位因淘汰不适合继续攻读学位研究生而产生的实际成本,是推进分流淘汰机制的可行措施。补偿制度的设计需要考虑影响培养单位淘汰决策的因素,包括对未来的预期、补偿率、补偿周期等。采取不同的补偿办法,培养单位会选取不同的淘汰行为,多个培养单位间的淘汰行为也将相互影响。本文运用博弈论等工具,对不同淘汰补偿机制下培养单位的淘汰决策行为进行研究。The compensation mechanism is effective in reducing the actual costs produced by selective elimination of graduate students in the course of cultivation for graduate education organizations. Factors affecting the decision of selective elimination should be taken into account when designing the compensation mechanism. By means of different compensation methods, different graduate education organizations will perform different selective elimination behavior. To get more quota, graduate education organizations＇ selective elimination behavior would be a gaming process. The paper, using game theory, analyzes the selective elimination decision-making behavior under different compensation mechanisms.

关 键 词：研究生招生 分流淘汰 补偿机制 博弈论 

分 类 号：G643[文化科学—高等教育学]