供应链竞争下产品族定制规划博弈模型及分析  

Game Model and Analysis of Product Family Customization Planning Strategies Under Supply Chain Competition

作　　者：王志亮[1] 白少布[2] 王云霞[1] WANG Zhi-liang BAI Shao-bu WANG Yun-xia(School of Mechanical Engineering, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China College of Economics ＆ Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China)

机构地区：[1]南京工程学院机械工程学院,江苏南京211167 [2]南京工程学院经济管理学院,江苏南京211167

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2016年第21期53-63,共11页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJAZH151);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJCZH209;13YJCZH201);南京工程学院创新基金重大项目(CKJA201208)

摘　　要：在大规模定制下,产品族定制规划不仅需确定各定制产品的性能定位、还需面对市场价格博弈.考虑制造商对市场的依存、及市场对高质量产品的偏好,分别构建了定制规划的一维和多维扩展Hotelling模型,基于模型的推理、计算与分析,首先证明了在一维产品族定制规划下各制造商可实现价格均衡和性能定位均衡;同时,证实质量因素能驱动均衡性能定位向高端转移,并通过价格博弈、促使制造商定制生产更高质量的产品,故从质量角度诠释了市场不断向高端进化的内部机理;其次,证实了多维产品族定制规划博弈仅存在均衡价格数值解、无全局精确解;最后,基于均衡价格数值解的聚类分析,提出博弈结构均衡概念,证实在多维定制规划中存在博弈结构均衡、并以此有效诠释了价格竞争中"价格维持-价格变更"这一价格循环波动现象的内在运作机理.博弈分析及结论将为企业评估、选择恰当的产品族定制规划策略提供有效决策支持.In MC, while planning product family, enterprises aot only need to determine the performance locations of the customized products, but also face the market price game. Considering the manufacturers＇ dependence on the market, and the consumers＇ preference for high quality products, the one-dimensional and multi-dimensional extended Hotelling models are built respectively, based on the models calculation and analysis, First of all, under one-dimensional product family customization planning, price equilibrium and performance location equilibrium can be obtained in turn by backward induction method. Secondly, it is proved that the quality factor can drive the equilibrium location to the high end, and through the price game, firms are impelled to manufacture the higher quality products. This conclusion explains the internal mechanism that the market persistently evolutes to the high-end from the perspective of quality. Thirdly, under multi-dimensional product family customization planning, only numerical solutions of equilibrium price can be obtained and no global exact solution. At last, based on the clustering analysis of the equilibrium price＇ numerical solution, the concept of game structure equilibrium is proposed. This paper confirms, game structure equilibrium can be gained in the multi-dimensional customization planning, and then is used to effectively demonstrate the internal operation mechanism of the price cycle fluctuation. Game analysis and conclusions will provide effective make decision while the enterprises evaluate and select the appropriate product family customization planning strategies.

关 键 词：供应链竞争 大规模定制 HOTELLING模型 价格均衡 定位均衡 博弈结构均 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F726