压力型体制与中国官员的降职风险:基于事件史分析的视角  

The Hazards of Incumbency under Pressure System:An Event History Approach

作　　者：钟灵娜 庞保庆[2] Zhong Lingna Pang B aoqing

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院 [2]上海大学社会学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2016年第10期54-74,共21页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：上海财经大学2014年研究生创新基金项目"官僚细分层级结构与晋升机制研究"(编号:CXJJ-2014-408)

摘　　要：以往对官员的研究主要集中在讨论影响官员晋升的因素上,文章利用事件史分析的方法讨论官员的降职风险。利用2000-2012年间市委书记的数据发现,首先,官员年龄与是否离任密切相关,特别年轻与特别年长的官员都面临较大的降职风险;其次,官员在任期间的经济绩效对降职风险影响显著,并且这一影响与官员的政治关系密切相关。被上级下派到地方加以培养锻炼的官员所面临的降职压力较小,而其他官员则需要努力提升经济绩效才能确保自己不会被降职淘汰。此外,文章还发现晋升风险概率与经济绩效之间并不存在类似的关系,说明晋升的机制可能更为复杂。A widespread belief about Chinese politics is that cadres cannot be easily demoted,thus the only incentive strategy is through promotion. Using prefectural party secretaries ＇ information from2000 to 2012,we find that hazard rate of cadres is correlated to age,economic performance and political networks,demonstrating a ＂pressure system ＂among local cadres. Both youngest and oldest cadres face more hazard than the rest. The economic performance,measured by GDP growth rate,has a negative impact on the demotion of cadres,especially among those who has no political networks with upper-level leaders. While no corresponding result has been found in the promotion hazard function,it suggests that promotion system may be more complicated. The result remains consistent and stable in several robustness checks.

关 键 词：官员降职 事件史分析 政治关系 压力型体制 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]