政府层级、审计意见与股价崩盘风险  

Governmental Hierarchies,Audit Opinion and Crash Risk of Stock Price

作　　者：潘秀丽[1] 王娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中央财经大学学报》2016年第11期57-65,共9页Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

摘　　要：笔者以2003—2014年A股上市公司为研究样本,选取股价崩盘风险这一视角,实证检验了审计意见对股价崩盘风险的影响,并进一歩从政府层级这个角度对这一影响进行了深层次的研究。结果发现,股价未来崩盘风险会在上市公司被出具非标审计意见后显著上升。进一步研究表明,产权边界不同,审计意见对股价崩盘风险的影响会随之变化。主要表现为:地方政府控制的上市公司显著削弱非标审计意见与股价未来崩盘风险的正相关关系;中央政府控制的上市公司也削弱了非标审计意见与股价崩盘风险的正相关关系,但不显著;而非政府控制的上市公司则强化非标审计意见与股价未来崩盘风险的正相关关系。因此,上市公司的产权边界,不仅可以从总体上影响股价未来崩盘风险,而且投资者在视审计意见对股票进行投资时也会考虑公司产权边界问题。Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2003 to 2014, this paper investigates the relationship between audit opinion and the crush risk of stock price from the perspective of information asymmetry. Meanwhile, this paper further analyzes this relations from the dimension of government hierarchics. The study finds that the crush risk of stock price increases significantly in the following year after being given modified audit opinions. Further study shows that the listed company being controlled by local government would weaken significantly the relationship between audit opinion and crash risk of stock price. The lis- ted company being controlled by central government would weaken the relationship between audit opinion and stock price crash risk, but its impact is not significant. The listed company not being controlled by government would strengthen significantly the relationship between audit opinion and stock price crash risk. The research findings show that not only the government hierarchies affect the crash risk of stock price in whole, but also investors would consider what function of the governmental hierarchies on the relationship of audit opinion and crash riskof stock price.

关 键 词：政府层级 审计意见 股价崩盘风险 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]