CIKS-128分组算法的相关密钥-差分攻击  

Related-Key Differential Attack on Block Cipher CIKS-128

作　　者：郭建胜[1,2] 崔竞一 罗伟 刘翼鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]解放军信息工程大学 [2]信息保障技术重点实验室 [3]78179部队

出　　处：《电子学报》2016年第8期1837-1844,共8页Acta Electronica Sinica

基　　金：博士后科学基金(No.2014M562582)

摘　　要：分析研究了CIKS-128分组密码算法在相关密钥-差分攻击下的安全性.利用DDP结构和非线性函数的差分信息泄漏规律构造了一条高概率相关密钥-差分特征,并给出攻击算法,恢复出了192bit密钥;在此基础上,对剩余64bit密钥进行穷举攻击,恢复出了算法的全部256bit密钥.攻击所需的计算复杂度为277次CIKS-128算法加密,数据复杂度为277个相关密钥-选择明文,存储复杂度为225.4字节存储空间.分析结果表明,CIKS-128算法在相关密钥-差分攻击条件下是不安全的.The security of CIKS-128 block cipher under related-key differential attack was studied.A related-key dif-ferential of high probability was constructed with the differential information leakages in the structure of DDPs and nonlinear functions.By proposing a corresponding key recovery attack based on the related-key differential,the master key of 192 bits was recovered.The rest 64 bits of the master key could be obtained by exhaustive search.The computational complexity,the data complexity and the memory complexity are 277 CIKS-128 block cipher encryptions,277 chosen-plaintexts and 225.4 bytes of storage resources,respectively.Analysis results show that CIKS-128 is unsafe under related-key differential attack.

关 键 词：分组密码 密码分析 CIKS-128分组算法 相关密钥-差分攻击 

分 类 号：TN918.1[电子电信—通信与信息系统]