钢铁利益集团影响下的贸易保护与产能过剩——基于钢铁进口保障措施与“冷轧板卷”反倾销案的案例研究  

Trade Protection and Overcapacity Infl uenced by Steel Interest Groups: A Case Study on the Protection Measures of Steel Import and Anti-dumping of “Cold Rolled Plate”

作　　者：顾振华[1] 沈瑶[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海商学院商务经济学院 [2]上海大学经济学院

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2016年第6期59-72,共14页International Business Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"产业动态发展视角下贸易政策与产业政策的协调机制与中国实践"(项目编号:71573171);上海市哲学社会科学青年项目"利益集团;贸易保护与产能过剩"(项目编号:2016EJB001);上海商学院教育教学改革研究项目"商业数据分析与stata应用"(项目编号:16-12066-3935)

摘　　要：以钢铁进口保障措施与"冷轧板卷"反倾销案作为切入点,对两起案件中政府、国内外钢铁利益集团和钢铁下游利益集团之间的博弈展开案例研究。结果表明:当面对利益受损时,国内钢铁企业、国外钢铁企业和政府以及国内钢铁下游企业会迅速组成利益集团;从影响机制上看,国内钢铁利益集团主要通过政治联系影响政府,国外和国内钢铁下游利益集团主要通过政治压力影响政府;从影响结果上看,强有力的国内钢铁利益集团能够获得"双重"贸易保护,这样的保护虽在当时帮助国内钢铁企业扩大了产能,但也为后来的产能过剩埋下了隐患;另外,国外钢铁利益集团和钢铁下游利益集团的存在则可以在一定程度上减小贸易保护的力度,缩短贸易保护的时间。The paper studies on the competition among government, domestic and foreign steel interest groups and downstream interest groups from the perspective of the cases of steel import protection measures and ＂cold rolled plates＂ anti-dumping. The results show that when facing interests, the domestic iron and steel enterprises, foreign steel companies and the government as well as the steel-downstream enterprises will quickly form interest groups. From the perspective of the mechanism, the domestic iron and steel interests mainly through political connections affect the government, foreign and domestic steel downstream interest groups mainly produce political pressure on government. From the perspective of the effect, powerful domestic steel interest groups can get the ＂double＂ of trade protection, which helps them to expand production capacity, but also hides troubles of overcapacity. In addition, the existence of foreign interest groups and steel downstream interest groups can reduce the intensity of trade protection to a certain extent, and shorten the time of trade protection.

关 键 词：案例研究 国内外利益集团 下游利益集团 贸易保护 产能过剩 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]