基于异质消费群体的废旧品回收契约设计研究  

Design of Waste Products Recycling Contract in Heterogeneous Market

作　　者：易余胤[1] 阳小栋[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第4期69-78,共10页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901033);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(暨南启明星计划)(12JNQM002)

摘　　要：基于消费者对新产品和再造品支付意愿异质的市场,运用博弈论构建了第三方负责回收废旧品的回收契约模型:单位回购价契约和总费用奖惩契约。首先,通过对单位回购价契约模型和总费用奖惩契约模型进行分析,得出各决策变量的均衡解。然后,分析了再制造成本节约、消费者对再造品的接受度等因素对两种契约的影响,并从制造商利润、回收率和零售价等各方面对比了两种契约的优劣,得出制造商选择回收契约的关键临界值。接着考虑了政府奖惩的因素对总费用奖惩契约模型进行了改进。最后,通过算例分析进一步验证和分析了所得到的理论成果。With continuous economic development, the problems of environmental degradation and shortage of resources have become increasingly prominent. Many countries have developed policies and laws to encourage enterprises to implement green production and management in order to reduce environmental pollution of waste products and improve resource utilization. The goals are to achieve the development of economy, society and environment in a harmonious way. From the realistic perspective of social development and legal system, it＇s an inevitable requirement for the manufacturer to recycle waste products for remanufacturing. Recycling waste materials is the key that manufacturers implement remanufacturing successfully. According to different collectors, there are a variety of waste materials recycling methods. The third-party collector gradually becomes the backbone of the recycling of waste products by virtue of its unique advantages. Therefore, research on closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing based on third-party collecting causes widespread concerns in the academic. Research topics include network optimization, pricing coordination, out.sourcing decision, evaluation and selection of the third-party collector, recycling responsibility sharing etc. However, there is no concern about waste materials recycling contract design issues. Therefore, based on the market in which consumers＇ willingness to pay for new products and recycled goods is heterogeneous, two kinds of contract models of waste products recycling for remanufacturing are built using the game theory, including buyback contract and total fee of incentive contract. First, the two models will be analyzed, and the equilibrium solution of the decision variables and the profit of manufacturer will be obtained. Second, the impact of consumer＇s preference parameter, cost savings by remanufactaring and other key parameters on the two kinds of contract models will be examined. With the comparison of the two contracts in terms of profit, recycling rate an

关 键 词：产品回收 再制造 回收契约 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]