信息搭便车下供应链订货与信息服务决策及协调研究  

Research on the Decisions of Order and Information Service and Coordination of Supply Chain with Information Free-riding

作　　者：徐兵[1] 刘露[1] 

机构地区：[1]南昌大学管理科学与工程系,江西南昌330031

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第4期117-123,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(NSFC70961006);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20100481186);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(2012T50593)

摘　　要：假定产品存在次品需返修、产品需求为随机且受到零售价格与信息服务水平的影响,建立单生产商和单零售商组成的传统渠道供应链的订货与信息服务的分散式和集中式决策模型,给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴合同。进而考虑电子商务零售商引入后免费搭乘传统零售商提供的信息服务行为,利用均衡分析方法建立了双渠道供应链的分散式决策的MPEC模型和集中式决策的优化模型,提出了协调双渠道供应链的回购加信息服务补贴合同。最后的算例表明模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性。研究表明:电子渠道的引入有利于供应链整体,恰当的信息搭便车行为、及产品正品率的提高有利于供应链各方。The development of information and network technology promotes the online transaction. The dual-channel mode, where the traditional retail channel and the network channel controlled by e-commerce retailers coexist, is widely adopted by many enterprises. There exists the information service free-riding behavior since e-commerce retailers may benefit from the information service of traditional retailers. For example, a lot of consumers acquire product information at the traditioual store, and then purchase the product online in order to pay at the lower price. At the same time, the product defective rate, return policy and remanufacturing strategy affect the retailers＇ order decision and the profit of supply chain. However, lack of studies has been done on the information free-riding behavior and remanufactufing defect products in dual-channel supply chain （DCSC） under stochastic demand. This paper establishes models to research on this problem. Firstly, his study considers that one supply chain （SC） with traditional retail channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. This study makes the assumption that there are defective products that need to be repaired, and the product demand is random and affected by retailers＇ sales price and information service level. This paper studies the Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer. The decentralized and centralized decision models of order and information service of SC are set up. It shows that the order quantity and information service level are lower in the decentralized mode than in centralized mode. Thus, one buy-back pins information service subsidy contract is put forward to coordinate this SC. Secondly, this study considers that the information service free-riding behavior of one e-commerce retailer, the MPEC model of decentralized decision mode and optimal model of centralized decision of DCSC are put forward by using the equilibrium analysis method. The order quantity and information service level are also lower in the decen

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 信息搭便车行为 次品退货与返修 带均衡约束的数学规划 回购加信息服务补贴合同 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]