双边信息不对称的供应链契约机制效率:基于实验研究  

The Contract Mechanism Efficiency of Supply Chain with Bilateral Asymmetric Information: A laboratory Investigation

作　　者：王新辉[1,2] 程红[3] 鄢仁秀[2,4] 汪贤裕[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学计算机与科学技术学院,四川成都610041 [2]四川大学商学院,四川成都610064 [3]成都理工大学管理科学学院,四川成都610059 [4]成都理工大学核技术与自动化工程学院,四川成都610059

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第4期179-186,共8页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助青年项目(71501161);教育部人文社会科学西部和边疆地区资助青年项目(13XJC630014);教育部人文社会科学研究资助青年项目(14YJC630020);教育部人文社会科学研究资助青年项目(15YJC630149)

摘　　要：契约机制是协调供应链企业行为的重要理论方法,却很少被实验验证。本文通过实验室实验的方法验证双边不对称信息下的供应链契约机制的效率。首先,简化了制造商和销售商双方各自成本信息不对称的数学模型,并基于此给出相应的契约机制和相应的数值算例,以此作为实验设计的基础。其次,按照实验经济学基本规范设计实验并进行了20轮有效实验。实验结果显示:(1)随着实验进行,被试真实共享信息的频率有逐渐增大的趋势,并在实验后半段频率趋于稳定。全程实验中,制销角色双方在真实共享信息比例都在63%以上.(2)被试的个体收益会受到对方信息是否真实共享的影响。如果任一方或双方谎报信息,双方收益都会受损。通过实验,我们发现如果决策者理性进行决策---最大化其期望收益,则会真实的共享信息。因此,理论契约机制在激励制销双方真实共享信息上总体是有效的,其效率损失的主要原因是被试个体的非理性行为。The contract mechanisms for supply chains are often used to coordinate individual firms＇ actions, and have been extensively studied by scholars for decades. Some contracts are proven efficient theoretically, such as buyback contract and revenue-sharing contract. However, in the experiments they do not work well as theoretical prediction. Thus, the contract mechanism for supply chain with asymmetric information may also have lower efficiency. This paper investigates the efficiency of contract mechanisms for a supply chain with asymmetric information, especially for the bilateral asymmetric case. In the first part, we present a simple model derived from the research on bilateral asymmetric information. First, we simplify the model without considering inventories and lost sales. Second, we propose the coordination mechanism （an ex ante contmc0 that specifies the commodity trading quantity and transfer payments. The transfer payments consist of an incentive scheme, based on the improved AGV （d＇Asprernont and Gerard-Varet） mechanism, and an allocation rule, based on the proportions of information rents. Last, we give a numerical example to illustrate the efficiency of contract mechanisms. In the second part, in an attempt to investigate the efficiency of contract mechanisms, we design experiments, including scene designing, reward designing and error controlling. As most laboratory experiments, we ask students participants to act as experimental subjects. We firstly set an imitation scene in which subjects can make their decisions under the direction of experimental specification. Second, subjects acting as the roles of manufacturer and retailer randomly choose to share their private information, determine their commodity trading quantity and transfer payments. When they get their private profit, they enter the next round and repeat the similar decision-making process again. After finishing all the experiments, subjects claim their rewards. In the third part, we present experimental and analysis results.

关 键 词：供应链 双边信息不对称 契约机制 实验 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]