地方政府跨界水污染治理的“公地悲剧”理论与中国的实证  

‘Tragedy of the Commons' Theory and Empirical Study in the Transboundary Water Pollution Treatment

作　　者：李国平[1] 王奕淇[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安710061

出　　处：《软科学》2016年第11期24-28,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大攻关项目(12&ZD072)

摘　　要：首先,构建多个地方政府之间的跨界水污染治理博弈理论模型,对地方政府的行为选择进行分析,结果表明地方政府跨界环境污染治理投入的纳什均衡最优小于整体的帕累托最优,二者呈现背离状态,并且背离程度随着参与跨界环境污染治理地区的增加而增加,导致"囚徒困境"和"公地悲剧"局面;其次,利用我国2012年62个主要水库和湖泊相关数据为研究样本,实证分析行政单位数量对水资源质量的影响,对理论假设进行验证;最后提出解决跨界水污染治理的政策建议。Firstly, this paper constructs the Game model of transboundary water pollution treatment, result indicates that the transboundary water pollution treatment investment of Nash equilibrium optimal is smaller than the Pareto optimal, both presents the departure from the state, and the deviate degree increases with the participation areas of transboundary water pollution treatment, leading to the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ and ＂tragedy of the commons＂ situation. Secondly, it empirically tests the influence of the quantity local government on water resources quality, and verifies the theoretical hypothesis by u- sing the 62 major reservoirs and lakes in 2012. Finally,it puts forward policy suggestions to improve the quality of water.

关 键 词：跨界水污染 公地悲剧 地方政府 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]