公司治理差的企业被做空了吗?——基于中国资本市场融券交易的实证研究  

Does Corporate Governancematter For Short sellers? Evidence from China's Emerging Capital Market

作　　者：张会丽[1] 白硕[1] 刘子琰 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院,北京100875 [2]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2016年第11期32-40,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(资助号:71202030)对本文的资助

摘　　要：本文以我国资本市场被列入融券名单的上市公司为考察对象,实证检验了公司治理对企业被融券做空水平的影响。以公司盈余管理和实际控制人控制权与现金流权的分离程度(简称"两权分离度")代理公司治理水平,研究表明,盈余管理水平及两权分离度与融券水平显著正相关,即公司治理差的企业被做空水平显著更高。进一步研究表明,相对于民营企业,国有企业低治理水平的做空效应更为显著。上述结论表明我国新兴的做空机制对识别公司治理不善的公司、督促资本市场中的企业尤其国有企业提高治理水平起到一定的积极作用。本文的研究为我国融券交易对资本市场的影响提供了横截面层面的证据,扩充了融资融券交易制度经济后果的文献,也对上市公司及监管机构具有启发意义。Using China＇s listed finns located in the short selling list, this paper empirically tests how corporate governance affects firms＇ levels of being sold short.We find that in terms of accrual earnings management and the level of separation between controlling and cash flow rights, the lower the level of corporate governance, the more possible of finns are to be sold short. In addition, as for state-owned finns, the negative relation between the level of corporate governance and short selling is statistically significant well that of non-state-owned firms is not. The conclusion shows that China＇s short-selling mechanism has certain positive effect on the identification of finns which have poor corporate governance.

关 键 词：融券 盈余管理 两权分离 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]