保障房退出的政府动机、执法成本与制度建构  

Government Motivation,Law Enforcement Cost and System Construction in Terms of Welfare House Exiting

作　　者：武中哲[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学法学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《山东财经大学学报》2016年第6期26-33,共8页Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目:"后单位社会住房保障制度的实践机制研究"(12BSH069)

摘　　要：保障房的退出是让那些生活水平得到较大改善,不再具备享受保障房资格的家庭退出保障房,以便为社会上的困难群体提供更多住房机会。保障房的退出有利于在控制增量的前提下实现保障房的供需平衡,因此具有较大政策意义。通过对保障房退出影响因素的实地研究,发现保障房的退出受到政府动机和执法成本的影响。不同类型的城市保障房的紧迫程度不同,因而对退出机制的需求以及由之产生的政策动机也不同。保障房的退出如果运用法律规制,则由于执法成本高,难以取得理想效果。与西方发达国家不同,中国城市保障房退出当下并不能完全依赖国家层面的普遍的法律规定,而应进行多层次的制度建构。其中,宏观层面的法律制度,中观层面的政府行政管理制度和微观层面的社会管理制度是保障房退出领域制度建构的基本框架。Welfare house exitin greatly improved that they are no lo g refers to the phenomenon that the families whose living standards have been so nger qualified to enjoying welfare houses sign out welfare houses. Welfare house exiting has great policy significance in that it helps to balance welfare house supply and demand in the premise of incremental control. A field study of the factors influencing welfare house exiting shows that the exiting is affected by government motivation and law enforcement cost. Different types of urban welfare houses have different urgency levels with different demands for exiting mechanism and different policy motivations. If operated by legal regulations, welfare house exiting has difficulty in achieving desired results because of high law enforcement cost. Different from western developed countries, China urban welfare house exiting can not depend entirely on country-level legal provisions. Instead, a multi- level system should be constructed, of which a legal system at macro level, a government administrative system at the middle level and a social management system at micro level constitute the basic framework for welfare house exiting system construction.

关 键 词：保障房退出 政府动机 执法成本 法律制度 社会控制 

分 类 号：F293.346[经济管理—国民经济]