扶贫资金筹集的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Poverty Alleviation Fund Raising

作　　者：唐华容[1] 赵肖京 TANG Huarong ZHAO Xiaojing(Marx School of Finance and Economics Schnol of Statistics Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025.China)

机构地区：[1]贵州财经大学马克思主义学院,贵阳550025 [2]贵州财经大学数统学院,贵阳550025

出　　处：《北方经贸》2016年第11期36-37,共2页Northern Economy and Trade

摘　　要：笔者针对扶贫资金筹集问题,建立了民间组织之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对动态方程做了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型的进化稳定策略,提出了一些促进扶贫资金筹集的合理建议。The author establishes tbe game model and the dynamic equation of the folk organization in the problem of poverty alleviation funds,And the dynamic equations are analyzed and discussed,the evolutionary stable strategy of the game model is obtained,some reasonable suggestions are put forward.

关 键 词：扶贫 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]