产能过剩、中央管制与地方政府反应  

Overcapacity,Central Government Regulation and Local Government's Responses

作　　者：杨其静[1] 吴海军[2] Yang Qijing Wu Haijun

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学经济学院,企业与组织研究中心,国家发展与战略研究院 [2]中国人民大学经济学院

出　　处：《世界经济》2016年第11期126-146,共21页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：2015年度中国人民大学科学研究基金项目面上重点项目(15XNA003)的资助

摘　　要：本文利用2007-2012年中国地级(包括副省级)城市工业用地出让的面板数据,对2009年9月中央开始实施的产能管制措施做了政策效果评估。研究发现:在实行产能管制措施之后,产能过剩-受管制行业的城市工业用地出让宗数增势受到显著抑制,但产能过剩-非管制行业的城市工业用地出让宗数仍然增势不减;市政府向受管制行业继续出让工业用地的现象依然非常普遍,尤其是在那些市领导具有较大潜在晋升机会的城市。这表明,虽然中央的管控措施可在短期缓解产能过剩问题,但中国经济平稳健康的长期发展还需深化市场经济体制改革和适当调整官员的考评晋升机制。Based on the 2007-2012 prefecture-industry-level panel data of the industrial land remise in China,this paper evaluates the effect of capacity control policies adopted by the central government in September 2009. We have two major results. First,after the capacity control policies were implemented,city governments depressed the amount of land remise in the regulated industries,while for the nonregulated industries,the amount of land remise kept increasing. Second,it was quite common that city governments violated the central government＇s prohibitions,especially when their secretaries and mayors had huge potentiall to be promoted. These empirical results imply that China＇s overcapacity problem is mainly and endogenously rooted in its special political economic system. In this sense,even though China＇s overcapacity problem may be relieved in the short term by central government＇s capacity control policies,it cannot be fundamentally resolved unless the market-oriented reforms are further implemented,and the political performance evaluation and promotion mechanisms are appropriately adjusted.

关 键 词：产能过剩 政府管制 工业用地出让 晋升竞争 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F299.23[政治法律—中外政治制度]