民营银行股东自担风险立法模式借鉴与选择  

Legislation Mode Reference and choice of Undertaking Risk by Private Banking Shareholders Themselves

作　　者：杨松[1] 宋怡林[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学法学院,辽宁沈阳110136 [2]辽宁科技大学,辽宁鞍山114051

出　　处：《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》2016年第6期150-162,共13页Science of Law：Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目:(13JZD012)"加快发展民营金融机构的法律保障研究";辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L13DFX023)"辽宁民营金融机构危机处置法律制度构建研究"

摘　　要：中国银行监管机构提出的民营银行股东自担剩余风险的监管要求,可以用商业银行股东加重义务来进行法学概括和表达,应当予以成文立法化。对此,美国和日本采用银行业基本法模式加以立法,俄罗斯采用银行破产法模式,中国台湾地区采用金融控股公司法模式。各类立法模式的选择均建立在金融发展实际以及法制传统基础上,中国立法模式的选择也应充分考虑中国金融及监管现实。中国应当采用银行业基本法为主,存款保险法和银行破产法为辅的立法模式,而不适宜采用金融控股公司法模式。Bank supervision institution of China required that private bank shareholders should undertake risk by themselves. This regulation can be generalize and express with commercial bank shareholders＂ enhanced obligation, and should be written legislation. U.S. and Japan legislate with mode of banking basic law, Russia with mode of banking bankrupt law, and Chinese Taiwan region with mode of financial holding company law. All the choices of mode are build on the financial development reality and legal tradition, and the choices of China also should consider the reality of finance and supervision. China should utilize the mode of banking basic law as major legislation, deposit insurance law and banking bankrupt law as aid legislation, and should not utilize the mode of financial holding company law.

关 键 词：民营银行 股东自担风险 股东加重义务 有限责任 

分 类 号：DF438.1[政治法律—经济法学]