竞争环境下面向资金约束供应商的均衡补偿策略  

Equilibrium subsidy strategies for the capital-constrained supplier under competition

作　　者：金伟[1] 骆建文[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2016年第11期2829-2838,共10页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71372107)~~

摘　　要：本文针对供应商的资金约束问题,研究了需求不确定条件下,两个竞争的制造商如何通过资金补偿策略改善供应商的资金约束问题.建立了包含两个竞争制造商,一个供应商在内的两阶段动态博弈模型,并给出了制造商的均衡补偿及均衡订货策略,进而分析了制造商的资金机会成本和供应商的资金水平对均衡补偿策略的影响.研究表明:当资金机会成本或供应商的资金水平低于某个临界值时,两个制造商均提供资金补偿;当资金机会成本或供应商的资金水平高于某个临界值时,两个制造商均不提供资金补偿;其余情况下,只有一个制造商提供资金补偿.最后,当供应商不提供批发价折扣时,越多的制造商进行资金补偿,供应商的收益越大.Based on a supplier＇s capital constraint problem, how two competing manufacturers improve the supplier＇s capital constraint by adopting financial subsidies under uncertain demand was investigated. A two-stage model with two competing manufacturers and a supplier was built. Meanwhile, manufacturers＇ equilibrium subsidies and equilibrium ordering decisions were provided. Moreover, the impacts of the manufacturer＇s financial opportunity cost as well as the supplier＇s capital level on the equilibrium subsidies were characterized. It reveals that, when the financial opportunity cost or the supplier＇s capital level is lower than a certain threshold value, both manufacturers offer subsidies; when the financial opportunity cost or the supplier＇s capital level is higher than a certain threshold value, neither manufacturer offers subsidy; otherwise, only one manufacturer offers subsidy. Finally, when the supplier doesn＇t provide wholesale price discount, the more manufacturers offer subsidies, the more benefits the supplier gains.

关 键 词：资金约束 均衡补偿策略 均衡订货策略 溢出效应 

分 类 号：F253.2[经济管理—国民经济] F272.3