征地利益冲突:地方政府与失地农民的行为选择机制及其实证证据  

The Conf licts of Farmland-acquisition:Behavior Mechanism of Local Government and Land-lost Peasants and Its Empirical Evidence

作　　者：鲍海君[1] 方妍[1] 雷佩 BAO Hai-jun FANG Yan LEI Pei(College of Public Administration, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《中国土地科学》2016年第8期21-27,37,共8页China Land Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(41371187);浙江省大学生科技创新活动计划(新苗人才计划)(2016R414041)

摘　　要：研究目的:构建地方政府与失地农民在征地中的行为选择机制,为征地利益冲突的缓解提供规制策略。研究方法:博弈论、案例分析法。研究结果:理论分析和实证证据表明,提高失地农民维权意识,降低失地农民维权成本,构建合理有效的违法征地行为处罚机制,能有效增加失地农民的征地收益,控制地方政府的违法征地冲动。研究结论:(1)在全面依法治国过程中,普及相关征地法律知识,提高失地农民组织化程度,畅通失地农民利益表达机制,能降低失地农民的维权成本;(2)完善现有土地督察制度,构建事前预防、事中监控、事后追惩的一体化惩罚体系,能加强对地方政府违法征地的整体性约束。The purpose of this study is to establish a behavior mechanism of local government and land-lost peasants during farmland-acquisition. Suggestions are provided to counter the conflicts of farmland-acquisition. The method of the game theory and case analysis were employed.The results from theoretical analysis and empirical evidence indicate that improving consciousness, reducing cost of peasants＇ rights protection and strengthening punishment of local government＇s illegal behaviors in farmland-acquisition can improve land-lost peasants＇ income and control local governments＇ illegal acquisition behaviors effectively. It concludes that propagating legal knowledge of land acquisition to land-lost peasants, establishing land-lost peasants＇ organization and building their interest claiming mechanism can reduce the rights protection cost; building land supervised system which includes ex-ante prevention, mid-stage monitoring and ex-post punishment can reinforce comprehensive constraint of local governments＇ behaviors in farmlandacquisition.

关 键 词：土地管理 征地冲突 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]