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机构地区:[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054
出 处:《预测》2016年第6期30-36,共7页Forecasting
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872092;71272118);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20136118110008);陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)
摘 要:管理者权力如何影响业绩压力和企业会计政策选择之间的关系是本文的研究重点。本文选取我国2012-2014年A股主板上市公司为研究对象,以资产减值准备的计提和转回为例,分析了业绩压力对企业会计政策选择的影响及管理者权力对二者之间关系的调节作用。研究发现,公司业绩压力越大,计提资产减值准备的比例越低,转回资产减值准备的比例越高;而管理者权力降低了业绩压力对资产减值准备计提、转回产生的影响。由此可见,新会计准则颁布后,资产减值会计政策仍为企业提供了足够的盈余管理空间,但管理者权力降低了有业绩压力的企业通过会计政策选择实施盈余管理的程度。The focus of this paper is to study how managerial power influences the relationship between performance pres- sure and companies' choosing of accounting policies. Based on sampling China A-share listed companies from 2012 to 201d, this paper, by investigating assets write-down and write-down reversals, explores both the influence of perform- ance pressure on choosing of accounting policies and the moderating effect of managerial power on the relationship between the two. The results show that the greater companies' performance pressure, the lower their assets write-down proportions and the higher their assets write-down reversals proportions. However, managerial power can reduce the influences mentioned above. Thus, although assets impairment accounting policies still provide enough room for China listed companies' earnings managements after new accounting standards promulgated, managerial power can reduce the extent that the companies with performance pressure implement earnings managements through choosing of accounting policies.
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