互联网环境下家电行业库存转运联盟收益分配研究  

Research on the Profit Allocation of Household Appliance Industry Inventory Transshipment in the Internet Environment

作　　者：马小勇[1] 陈良华[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《预测》2016年第6期63-68,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272111);中央高校基本科研专项资金资助项目((KYLX_0210)

摘　　要：处于供应链下游的家电行业实体零售商与多网络零售商合作,网络零售商可以通过实体零售商进行库存转运,提高合作效益。本文建立了三阶段库存转运竞合模型,在需求实现之前各自独立订货,需求实现之后零售商可以决定他们共享剩余库存或需求的数量,最后实施库存转运并分配其产生的利润。前两个阶段是竞争性的,后一个阶段是合作性的,其利润分配方案,会对前两个阶段的决策产生影响。研究表明,核心分配、Shapley值分配等方法均有局限性,应用Shapley值分配规则,将导致家电零售商最大化第二阶段库存共享的数量,但是Shapley值可能不属于核心,因此从短视的观点看,将导致大联盟的不稳定。但是,如果从远视的观点来看,Shapley值分配将导致大联盟是所有情形下唯一稳定的联盟结构。Considering the system of one physical retailer and multi online retailers in the household appliance industry, physical retailer can transship the products to the online retailers, and increase their profits. Establishing the three-stage inventory transshipment model, before the demand is realized, each retailer independently orders her inventory, after the demand is realized, each retailer decides how much of her residual supply/demand she wants to share with the other retailers, lastly implement inventory transshipment and distribute the profit. The first two stages are competitive, the lat- ter stage is cooperative, the profit distribution plan will influence the first two stages of the decision. Research shows, due to the Shapley value satisfy the coalitional monotonieity, applying Shapley value allocation rules, will cause the num- ber of retailers maximize the second stage inventory sharing, but Shapley values may not belong to the core, so from the myopic view, will cause the coalition instability. However, if from the farsighted view, Shapley value distribution will lead the grand coalition to the only stable coalition structure in all case.

关 键 词：家电零售商联盟 竞合博弈 库存转运 远视稳定 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]