考虑隐性违约风险的BOT项目特许期决策模型研究  

Decision-making Model on Concession Period for BOT Project under the Implicit Default Risk

作　　者：陈通[1] 吴正泓[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《预测》2016年第6期69-74,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272148;71271152);教育部高校博士点基金资助项目(20120032110039)

摘　　要：特许期为BOT项目提供了高效的管理边界,是影响项目成功与否的一项重要因素。基于BOT项目的不确定性特征和私人部门隐性违约风险对特许期决策的影响,本文首先运用实物期权理论构建公私部门投资决策模型,得到特许期可行区间;然后,引入演化博弈思想,构建公私部门特许期决策演化博弈模型,求出考虑隐性违约风险的特许期可行区间;此外,分析了私人部门决策临界值的影响因素;最后,通过案例分析检验模型有效性。研究结论为BOT项目特许期的确定提供了一种新的思路。Concession period is an important factor affecting the success of BOT projects, which provides an efficient management boundary. Considering the influence of uncertainty and the private sector＇ s implicit default risk, firstly, the investment decision-making model of public and private sectors is constructed to obtain the feasible interval of the concession period. Secondly, based on the evolutionary game theory, a decision-making game model is constructed to precise the feasible interval of the concession period, which is considering the implicit default risk. Then influential factors of the private sector＇ s decision critical value are analyzed. Thirdly, a case study is used to verify the validity of the model. The conclusion of this research provides a new way to decide the concession period for BOT project.

关 键 词：BOT项目 特许期 违约风险 实物期权 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]