消费者“搭便车”行为影响下的双渠道供应链定价和促销策略研究  被引量:51

Pricing and Promotion Strategies in the Dual-channel Supply Chain Considering the Free-riding Behavior of Consumers

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作  者:浦徐进 龚磊 

机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122 [2]食品安全与营养协同创新中心,江苏无锡214122

出  处:《中国管理科学》2016年第10期86-94,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基  金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71371086);江南大学自主科研计划重点项目(JUSRP51416B);江苏省哲学社会科学优秀创新团队(2013-011);国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA069)

摘  要:在制造商主导的二层双渠道供应链背景下,考察由于实体店促销努力而新进入市场消费者的"搭便车"行为,刻画供应链定价和促销策略发生的变化,并设计一个制造商分担实体店促销努力成本的协调机制来改善供应链运作效率。研究发现:(1)促销成本分担机制的介入将同时提高实体店零售价格和网店直销价格,但无论是否存在促销成本分担机制,网店直销价格均显著低于实体店零售价格;(2)新进入市场消费者的"搭便车"行为将会显著降低实体店促销努力水平和供应链整体利润水平;(3)促销成本分担机制可以实现制造商和实体店双方利润水平的Pareto改进。最后用数值仿真验证了促销成本分担机制作为供应链协调机制的可行性。With the rapid development of the Internet,manufacturers are increasingly adopting a dual-channel approach to selling products,(i.e.,a traditional retail channel and an online direct channel).Consequently,consumers can experience a product in a brick-and-mortar store while shopping online for the cheapest price.Using the two-stage optimization technique and the Stackelberg game,we examine the impact of consumer free-riding on sales effort and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain.We find that both the sales effort and the whole supply chain profit are much lower in the decentralized setting than in the centralized setting.Moreover,the sales effort and the whole supply chain profit decrease as the rate of free-riding increases in both centralized and decentralized settings.In order to improve supply chain efficiency,we propose a certain cost-sharing contract.This contract is proved to lead to a Pareto improvement for both supply chain partners.The numerical study demonstrates how the proposed contract is applied as well as how it improves supply chain efficiency.

关 键 词:双渠道供应链 促销努力 “搭便车”行为 成本分担机制 

分 类 号:F224[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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