基于奖惩契约的养老服务供应链质量控制协调  

Quality Control and Coordination in Elderly Service Supply Chain Based on Bonus and Penalty Dual Contract

作　　者：张智勇[1] 吕嘉欣[1] 石永强[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学经济与贸易学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《工业工程》2016年第5期58-64,共7页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(12BGL025)

摘　　要：研究单个养老服务集成商和养老服务提供商构成的养老服务供应链,围绕单一同质的养老服务需求,分析服务集成商和服务提供商在单独决策、联合决策以及使用奖惩契约3种情形下的质量博弈,并进一步通过比较讨论奖惩契约对于养老服务质量决策和供应链成员收益的改善作用。研究表明,养老服务供应链一体化程度越高,提供高质量养老服务的可能性越大;当养老服务需求规模的变化对服务质量提升的敏感程度较高时,奖惩契约的协调效果较好;若服务集成商在供应链中处于核心地位,当与服务提供商达成提供高质量养老服务奖惩契约时,采用奖惩契约所获得的收益增加大部分被服务集成商获取。Equilibrium is analyzed from three different scenarios of separate decision, united decision and bonus and penalty dual contract based on the Elderly Service Supply Chain （ESSC） between one elderly service integrator （ESI） and one elderly service supplier （ESS） with a single and homogeneous elderly service need. The promotion of bonus and penalty dual contract to the elderly service quality decision and the profits of the supply chain members are also studied. The results show that the possibility of providing high quality elderly service will increase by improving the integration of the ESSC and when the change of the demand scale is sensitive to the service quality improvement, bonus and penalty contract can get better coordination effect. In addition, if the ESI is at the core position of the ESSC, when the ESI and the ESS reach bonus and penalty contract providing high quality elderly service, the ESI would obtain most of the increased profit.

关 键 词：养老服务供应链 养老服务质量 奖惩契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]