赢家?输家?——《敲诈》中的博弈分析  

The Winner? The Loser?——An Analysis of the Game in The Blackmail

作　　者：张志敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]延安大学外国语学院,陕西延安716000

出　　处：《延安大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第6期85-88,共4页Journal of Yan'an University (Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：《敲诈》是典型的博弈案例,博弈双方——公爵夫人和敲诈者,最终达到了自己的目的,实现了个人利益的最大化,博弈双方都得到了满足,取得了"纳什均衡"的效果,理论上双方都是赢家。然而,从眼前利益、长远利益和公共利益三个角度来看这场博弈,却能得出不同的结论。The Blackmail is a typical case of game. The two sides of the game——the Duchess and the blackmailer,achieved their ends,maximized their own profit in the end. Both sides are satisfied and the game achieved Nash Equilibrium. Theoretically,both sides are winners. Whereas,different conclusions can be reached when viewing the game from different perspectives,such as immediate interest,long-term interest and public interest.

关 键 词：敲诈者 公爵夫人 赢家 输家 

分 类 号：I106[文学—世界文学]