煤矿安全投资博弈模型研究  

Study on the Game Models of Coal Mine Safety Investment

作　　者：牟勇[1] 陈昌云[1] 胡祖祥[2] 王佰顺[2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽理工大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮南232001 [2]安徽理工大学能源与安全学院,安徽淮南232001

出　　处：《安徽理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第5期30-36,共7页Journal of Anhui University of Science and Technology:Social Science

基　　金：安徽省高校人文社会科学研究重点项目(项目编号:SK2016A0290)

摘　　要：煤矿安全投资显著影响安全水平,中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和煤矿员工高度关注煤矿安全水平。建立煤矿与煤矿员工、中央政府与地方政府、煤矿与地方政府、地方政府与煤矿员工四个静态博弈模型,分析四个参与方的理性行为,对博弈的纳什均衡分析发现:(1)煤矿按照自己的意志决定安全投资水平,安全投资常常不足;(2)地方政府监管力度取决于中央政府的监督力度;(3)煤矿员工部分遵守安全规程,对安全事故隐患和调查保持沉默。根据博弈均衡分析结果,对提升安全水平提出四个建议:(1)彻底实行由国家安监总局垂直领导各级地方安全监督管理机构;(2)煤矿违规的罚款与其安全投资要有可比性;(3)科学计算事故损失,尤其是伤亡事故生命价值的损失;(4)提高机械化程度。The investment in coal mine safety significantly affects the level of coal mine safety, about which the central government, local governments, coal mining enterprises and coal mine employees are highly concerned. Four static game models were built of coal mines and coal mine employees, the central government and local governments ,coal mines and local governmentsj local governments and coal mine employees. The participants. rational behaviors were analyzed and findings through the Nash equilibria are as follows： （1） coal mines deciding safety investments according to their own will results in inadequate investment; （2） the strictness of local governments’ supervision depends on that of the central govemment, s supervision; （3） coal mine employees partially comply with safety regulations, but keep silent to accident investigation. According to the findings, we put forward four suggestions to improve the safety situation： （1） complete implementation of vertical leadership by the State Administration of Work Safety; （2） the cost of coal mines violating safety regulations should be in proportion with safety investment, （3） accurate calculation of coal mine accident loss, especially the value of life loss; （4） mechanization of coal mine.

关 键 词：纳什均衡 博弈 煤矿 安全投资 行为 

分 类 号：X915.4[环境科学与工程—安全科学] F406.1[经济管理—产业经济]