Information Revelation in Sequential Auctions with Uncertainties About Future Objects  

作　　者：HU Erqin ZHAO Yong RAO Congjun 

机构地区：[1]School of Automation,Huazhong University of Science and Technology [2]School of Science,Hubei University of Technology [3]School of Science,Wuhan University of Technology

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2016年第6期1617-1628,共12页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61273206 and 71471069

摘　　要：In many auctions,buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future.Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers.In this paper,two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer's valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one,and the true value of k is sellers' private information.The authors identify three factors which affect sellers' revelation strategies: The market's competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers,buyers' prior information about the second object,and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k.The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller,but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller,respectively.

关 键 词：Future objects revelation strategy sequential auctions unit-demands. 

分 类 号：F724.59[经济管理—产业经济]