宋代酒类买扑制度的演变逻辑  

Evolution of Maipu System of Liquor Business in Song Dynasty

作　　者：刘超凤 郭风平[1] 杨乙丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北农林科技大学人文社会发展学院,杨陵712100

出　　处：《兰台世界》2016年第24期130-133,共4页Lantai World

摘　　要：酒类酤榷为国家财政带来巨大的收益,宋代则继承发展了私人承包经营酒坊的买扑制度。宋代酒类买扑制度历经"募民买扑"、"酬奖衙前"和"实封投状法"等阶段,虽差别甚大,但离不开国家权力对于酒业产权的控制。借助新制度经济学的国家理论,可以更好地了解酒类买扑制度的演变逻辑。在监管成本大、产权分散等情况下,国家多倾向于扩大买扑经营,来实现社会总产出最大化;而当酒利骤升,在不改变经营结构的前提下,国家通过制度创新提高酒利课额,来达到国家财政收入最大化。归根结底,酒品经营模式的演变主要受制于国家对其目标的追逐。Liquor inherited and dev dynasty went monopoly greatly improved the country＇s financial revenue. In the Song dynasty eloped, which enabled ordinary people to operate a liquor store. The Maipu system through several stages, such as ＂recruiting civilians＂, rewarding ＂the Maipu system＂ was of liquor industry in Song corvee＂ and ＂auction＂. Although there were big differences among them, they couldn＇t do without the country＇s control over liquor property. With the state theory of the new institutional economics, we can better understand the evolution of the Maipu system in liquor industry. Under the conditions of costly supervision and distributed property, the country tends to expand separate operation to maximize total social output; and when the liquor profits rise, the country will innovate system and raise liquor taxes to maximize national financial revenue without changing the previous operating structure. Ultimately, the evolution of the liquor operation mode is highly subject to nationaltargets.

关 键 词：买扑制度 国家目标函数 实封投状 产权与收益 

分 类 号：K244[历史地理—历史学]